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THE ADVENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
AND ITS FUTURE*
VERY government exercises three governmental powersE that are necessary for its existence. They are Taxation,
Police Power, and the Power of Eminent Domain. Every
government, however crude, or whatever we may call it,
must have the power first to make the law, which is called
the legislative power; second, it must have the power to
declare what the law is, which is the judicial power; and
third, it must have the power to enforce the law and this
is called the executive power.
In the very early governments such as the government
of the clan or tribe, these three powers of government were
exercised by one person - the chief. So, in an absolute
monarchy, these three powers are vested in one person, the
czar or emperor. Today, in the dictatorship of Europe,
the dictator exercises both legislative and executive powers
and controls the courts. In our country we are committed
to the doctrine of separation of powers and our constitutions
provide for such separation. These three powers are ex-
ercised by distinct persons or groups of persons. Under our
*A paper read before The ROUND TABLE, a discussion group in South Bend,
Indiana, on the 5th day of February, 1941.
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constitutions, the congress or legislature legislates, the courts
declare, construe and interpret the law, and the president
or governor executes or enforces the law. Checks and bal-
ances in the exercise of these powers are thus provided, and
our rights and liberties better secured.
From the very beginning of our government, the proper
exercise of these three powers required agencies such as
committees, boards, bureaus and commissions. Our congress
and our legislatures have and do carry out the legislative
powers through committees, boards and commissions. The
president and the governor always have had and must have
administrative agencies to properly carry out the executive
powers of government. Why, even the courts, in order to
properly carry out the judicial function, utilize administra-
tive agencies such as commissions or referees to take testi-
mony, adjusters, receivers, appraisers, etc. Administrative
agencies such as these are nothing new in government. They
have existed since organized government began. They are
the officials appointed or elected to do the detail work and
to carry out the will of the legislative, executive and judicial
branches of government.
Since the Civil War, and especially since 1900, there has
been a steady and at times a speedy growth of administrative
agencies. Their advent has been heralded and viewed with
alarm and those appointed to carry out the purposes for
which they were created have been maligned. There have
been wild estimates as to the number in each State and in
the federal jurisdictions. That at times an unnecessary
board or commission was created ought not to justify a
condemnation of the entire administrative machinery of
government. Our democratic government simply cannot
function without them.
Right here let me quote from the address of Judge John
J Parker of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, be-
fore the Annual Meeting of the Nebraska State Bar Associa-
tion on December 28, 1940:
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"One of the outstanding developments of recent years has been the
growth in the executive departments of our governments, state and fed-
eral, of administrative agencies combining with their executive functions
powers which are essentially legislative or judicial in character. There
are more than a hundred and fifty such agencies in the federal govern-
ment alone. Every state government has a large number of them for
dealing with such matters as taxes, public utilities, insurance,. securities,
workmen's compensation, and social security. To my mind it is
utterly futile to inveigh against the growth of these tribunals. That
growth has been perfectly natural. Under the conditions of modern life
it is absolutely necessary that the state regulate economic life. Laissez
faire is gone. The conflict is not between laissez faire and regulation, but
between regulation and some form of state socialism. If socialism is to be
avoided, the state must regulate economic life. The courts cannot furnish
this regulation. The legislature cannot furnish. it. It can only be fur-
nished by these administrative agencies combining, as they do, certain
executive, judicial and legislative functions. And, if government is to
exercise the control over economic life essential to the preservation of
free enterprise, some such form of administrative agency is absolutely
necessary to the proper and efficient exercise of governmental power.
The problem is, not to prevent their growth, but to preserve in their
processes the fundamental principles of freedom which have come down
to us from the fathers." 1
It is my purpose to discuss a few of the boards and to give
answer to the following questions; why were they created?
what purposes do they carry out? do they impair or destroy
our rights and liberties? what of the future? can democracy
work without them?
Following the Civil War there was a great "western move-
ment." There was great expansion in the building of rail-
roads. Practically all of the interstate commerce was then
carried on by the railroads. The organization of railroad
companies and the construction of railroads involved large
expenditures of money. To pay for this and make profit,
it was nothing unusual for railroad companies to exact ex-
cessive rates, make discriminatory contracts as to rates, in
violation of law. What was happening then is better stated
by Justice Shiras of the United States Supreme Court in the
1 Hon. John J. Parker, "Improving the Administration of Justice," 27 A. B.
A. J. 71, 7S (1941).
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case of Texas & Pacific Railway Company v. Interstate
Commerce Commission.2
"While shippers of merchandise are under no legal necessity to use
railroads, practically they are. The demand for speedy and prompt
movement virtually forbids the employment of slow and old-fashiofied
methods of transportation, at least in the case of the more valuable
articles of traffic .... From the very nature of the case therefore, rail-
roads are monopolies, and the evils that usually accompany monopolies
soon began to show themselves, and were the cause of loud complaints.
The companies owning the railroads were charged, . . . with making
unjust discriminations between shippers and localities, with making
secret agreements with some to the detriment of other patrons, and with
making pools or combinations with each other, leading to oppression of
entire communities.
"Some of these mischiefs were partially remedied by special provisions
inserted in the charters of the companies and by general enactments
by the several States, such as clauses restricting the rates of toll and
forbidding railroad companies from becoming concerned in the sale or
production of articles carried and from making unjust preferences. Re-
lief, to some extent, was likewise found in the action of the courts in
enforcing the principles of the common law applicable to common car-
riers - particularly that one which requires uniformity of treatment in
like conditions of service.
"As the powers of the States were restricted to their own territories,
and did not enable them to efficiently control the management of great
corporations whose roads extend through the entire country, there was
a general demand that Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power
over the subject of foreign and interstate commerce, should deal with
the evils complained of by a general enactment, and statute (Inter-
state Commerce Act) in question was the result."
The Interstate Commerce Commission Act was passed
February 4, 1887, and the Commission was established
March 22, 1887. This Act was so clearly within the powers
of congress over interstate commerce that no serious ques-
tion was raised as to its constitutionality. Most of the ques-
tions raised were with reference to the powers conferred
upon the Commission and the extent of those powers. How-
ever, the Act was not free from attack in the courts. By
decisions the original Act soon proved to be quite ineffective.
Courts strictly limited the power of the Commission to the
2 162 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 666, 40 L. Ed. 940 (1895).
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prevention of excessive rates and unjust discrimination in
rates. Courts denied to the Commission the power to fix
rates for the future. Because of these limitations it became
necessary for congress to amend the Act every few years.
These amendatory acts were passed to remedy the defects
in the original Act and give added powers to the Commission
which the courts denied. Let me cite a few of these amend-
ments.
The amendatory act of 1889 gave the shipper a more ef-
fective remedy by writ of mandamus to compel carriers to
furnish equal facilities.
The act of 1893 amended procedure by overcoming the
difficulty in enforcing self-incriminatory testimony.
The act of 1903 (sometimes called the Elkins Law) made
very important changes and improved the provisions against
discrimination and make the published rates conclusive
against the carrier. Fine was substituted for imprisonment
in the penal provisions of the act. The act of 1903 was
procedural and expedited the procedure in suits brought by
the United States or suits brought by the attorney general
in the name of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
In 1906 the amendatory act (sometimes called the Hep-
burn Act) prohibited free passes and prescribed the so-called
"Commodity Clause" which prohibited the railroads from
transporting their own commodities not used in the railroad
business.
The amendatory act of 1910, known as the Mann-Elkins
Law, "enlarged the substantive provisions of the act to regu-
late commerce, corrected numerous defects which experience
had disclosed, conferred upon the public new rights and
remedies and correspondingly increased the jurisdiction and
authority of the Commission." Since that time, with the
expansion in business and industry as interstate commerce
grew other amendatory acts have been passed.
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About 1900 the work of the Commission was recognized
by both the public and the railroads to be, on the whole,
satisfactory. Both the public and the railroads would have
resisted then and would resist today any attempt to abolish
the Commission and return to the days of 1886.
Not only that, so satisfied were the people of the United
States with the regulatiofi of interstate commerce by the In-
terstate Commerce Commission, that legislatures of the
States have created commissions to regulate intra-state com-
merce and local public utilities. Time will not permit me to
relate the story of the advent of and the public service per-
formed by State public utility commissions. They have
saved to the American public incalculable millions in public
utility rates. Because of their cooperation with the commis-
sions in the regulation of rates, in matters of safety, service,
and comfort to the people, America today can rightly and
proudly boast of the greatest public utility service in the
world.
Now, why Workmen's Compensation Acts and Compensa-
tion Boards and Commissions? The public satisfaction
with the work of the Interstate Commerce Commission and
the Public Utilities Commissions was partly responsible for
the steady enactment of Workmen's Compensation Acts in
all but one State and in the federal jurisdiction.
There were other factors which contributed. The suc-
cess with which compensation legislation met on the con-
tinent of Europe, in Great Britain and Canada was a fac-
tor. But, the dissatisfaction of the public with our personal
injury suits gave the commanding impetus to our legislators
for action.
Legislative ad interim committees were appointed in Mas-
sachusetts in 1903; in Illinois in 1905; in New York, Wis-
consin and Minnesota in 1909. These committees made a
thorough investigation of different acts and their operation,
and of the conditions existing in practice in personal-injury
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cases. Exhaustive reports were made in the sessions that
followed. The reports showed an appalling condition exist-
ing in our swiftly expanding industrial system. The investi-
gation disclosed that out of every $100 that industry paid
out for negligent injuries only $30 of it went to the injured
employee and $70 went to expenses for investigators, at-
torneys' fees and court costs. Many of us here, and especial-
ly the older lawyers, remember the lawsuits against railroads,
sawmill and other manufacturing companies. Results in
such actions many times hinged not on facts and substantial
rights, but upon technicalities of procedure and upon the skill
of the attorneys. In the court rooms we saw attorneys argu-
ing demurrers and motions. We witnessed sharp cross-
examinations, badgering of witnesses, objections to the ad-
mission of truth sometimes ruled out on some technical rule
of evidence. We would also hear great pleas made to the
jury, great orations, sometimes with appeals to passion and
prejudice. At times in the corridors and on the courthouse
steps we would see lame and crippled men. We would listen
to verdicts of juries, one plaintiff getting $1,000, and an-
other $5,000, and another nothing for practically the same
kind of injury.
Let me relate briefly the facts and procedure in a case 35
years ago. Johnson, a young man 18 years old, was an em-
ployee of a wood-working company. He was employed at
operating a rip-saw. His work was to split 4-foot bolts into
square pieces. He placed the bolts on the carriage of the
rip-saw and ripped them by pushing the carriage back and
forth through the saw. While he was pulling the carriage
toward him a piece of slab was thrown toward him by the
teeth of the saw. He threw up his hand to protect his head,
the slab struck him and broke his wrist so that he was laid
up for 12 weeks and suffered about 25% permanent dis-
ability in the use of his hand. The complaint filed was for
$3,000 damages. The defendant company was represented
by an insurance company attorney. For some reason, the
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case was postponed over the term, which delayed action for
six months. At the next term the case came up for trial. It
took two days to try the case. Some testimony was ruled
out and some of it was admitted under objections, after
arguments. There was a lengthy argument over the intro-
duction of an answer to a question whether or not a splitter
was put on the saw the day after the accident; Johnson
testified that there was no splitter on the saw at the time of
the accident; the foreman testified that there was a splitter
on the saw; a witness testified that the splitter was taken off
for repairs, and a controversy then arose as to whether the
witness could testify that the splitter was put on after the
accident. The court ruled this evidence out saying that
under the rule it was contrary to public policy to admit
such evidence. At the conclusion of the evidence, a motion
for a directed verdict was argued upon the following
grounds: first, that there was no proof of negligence; sec-
ond, that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence;
and third, that from the testimony in the case it was impos-
sible for the accident to have happened, because the pulling
of the carriage back with the cant in place made it impos-
sible for the slab to be caught by the saw and thrown to-
ward the plaintiff. Demonstrations of this were made be-
fore the jury. The court overruled the motion and the case
was submitted to the jury. After the usual oratory, the
jury was instructed, and after two hours of deliberation re-
turned a verdict for the plaintiff for $1,000. Ten days were
given to the defendant for preparing and filing a motion for
a new trial. A month later the motion was argued on prac-
tically the same points that were raised in the motion for a
directed verdict plus that the verdict was excessive. The
court decided that he would grant a new trial unless the
plaintiff would remit $300 and gave the plaintiff ten days
in which to make up his mind. Upon consulation with his
attorneys and his father, and upon contemplating the tor-
ture of another trial, Johnson accepted the $700 plus costs.
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It took nearly two years from the time of the accident be-
fore Johnson got what was left of the $700 after he paid
attorneys' fees. The story of Johnson's case was not an
unusual one.
How long would to take for Johnson to get compensation
for his injuries under a Workmen's Compensation law? I
venture to say that it would take about half an hour. The
chances are that he would be paid his compensation without
a hearing before the Industrial Commission. If there was
a contest it would probably be over the period of total dis-
ability and the extent of the permanent disability. There
would be no question about contributory negligence on the
part of Johnson, nor negligence on the part of the com-
pany. Nor would it matter whether the splitter was put on
the saw before or after the accident. There would be no
question raised as to the impossibility of the accident to hap-
pen. It did happen and Johnson sustained injuries. If
there was a hearing before the Commission it would prob-
ably proceed like this: the parties would stipulate that at
the time of the accident, (1) both parties were subject to
the Compensation Act; (2) that Johnson was injured while
at work; (3) that he was unable to work, say for 12 weeks.
Probably the only question in dispute would be that of the
extent of permanent disability. Testimony of one or two
doctors as to the extent of permanent disability would con-
clude the evidence. Let us suppose that the permanent dis-
ability was fixed at 25 %. How much compensation would
be paid to Johnson in a State which allows a compensation
rate of 66-2/3% of the average weekly wage and allows 240
weeks for the loss of a hand at the wrist? If, at the time
he was employed, he was getting $15 per week, his compen-
sation rate would be $10 a week. Twelve weeks plus Y of
240 weeks or 60 weeks, equals 72 weeks. 72 times $10 is
$720, about the same amount which was allowed in the per-
sonal injury action. Can there be any doubt that the ad-
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ministrative process is preferable to the process in the per-
sonal injury actions in court?
With evidence of the existence of such conditions in our
industrial system, States vied with each other in the enact-
ment of the Workmen's Compensation Laws. New York was
the first, in 1910, but that act was declared unconstitutional.
The constitution was amended and a valid act was passed in
1913. Legislatures of the following States enacted compen-
sation acts in 1911: Wisconsin, May 3rd; Nevada, July 1st;
New Jersey, July 4th; California, Sept. 1st; and Washing-
ton, October 1st. Many of the other States followed during
1912 and today every State and federal jurisdiction have
Workmen's Compensation Acts except Mississippi.
I have probably discussed too much in detail the advent
of the Compensation Board. That is due to two reasons.
One is because of my familiarity with it and the other one
is the similarity of reasons for the advent of one or two
other boards which I will discuss.
What about the advent of the Federal Trade Commission
Act which was passed by Congress on September 16, 1914.
Why was it necessary to create the Federal Trade Commis-
sion? Following the Civil War came the 14th Amendment
to the United States Constitution. That Amendment
reads, in part, as follows:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
Anyone, familiar with the history of our reconstruction
period, knows that the purpose of this Amendment was to
secure equality and protection to those individuals who were
made citizens under the 13th Amendment.
When congressmen voted to submit the 14th Amendment
to the States, and the State legislators voted to ratify it, they
had no thought that this Amendment would be employed as
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a refuge for the protection of franchises and property of
private corporations. When the United States Supreme
Court, by a line of decisions, held that corporations were
Cpersons" within the provisions of the 14th Amendment, it
practically annulled the reserve powers for alteration, amend-
ment or repeal of general incorporation laws. These de-
cisions sounded the death-knell to any control over corpora-
tions by the people through their legislatures. This did more
to promote the use of corporations for the expansion of busi-
ness and industry than any other cause. Our industry grew
and expanded and capitalization doubled and tripled every
few years and so did production. At first the activities
were local and confined to one State, but under a liberal sys-
tem of licensing corporations, the field of industry became
national and with this came the trusts. These soul-less per-
sons organized for profit and for profit alone, destroyed all
competition. The little industries which were the pride of
many communities in America were eliminated. Then came
the State anti-trust laws, then followed subterfuges to evade
them and feeble efforts to enforce them. Such conduct be-
ing inimical to the public welfare, and States, under their
State laws being unable to cope with this conduct, Congress
on July 2, 1890 passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. This
statute was enacted for the purpose of protecting freedom
of trade; maintaining free competition and securing equality
of opportunity in trade. The United States Supreme Court
said: "The Anti-Trust Act was intended in the most com-
prehensive way to provide against combinations or con-
spiracies in restraint of trade or commerce, the monopoliza-
tion of trade or commerce or attempts to monopolize'the
same." 
3
Did the Sherman Anti-Trust Act accomplish the purpose for
which it was enacted?
3 Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Coin Products Refining Co., 236 U. S. 165, 35 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 398, 59 L..Ed. 520 (1914).
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Prolonged litigation in the courts, technicalities of pro-
cedure, strict and strained construction by the courts, limited
the enforcement of the Sherman Act, and trusts and monopo-
lies continued their occupation of restraining trade and us-
ing unfair and discriminatory practices in trade. Equality
of opportunity and the right of freedom of trade continued
to be destroyed. So dilatory and ineffective were proceed-
ings in the courts, in enforcing the Sherman Act that Con-
gress enacted the Federal Trade Commission Act, creating
another commission. As in the case of the Compensation
Acts, attacks on its constitutionality were made, but with-
out success.4
For over 25 years the Federal Trade Commission has
operated and has succeeded so well in destroying unfair
methods and practices in industry and trade that industry
would oppose its abolishment.
Now, what about the National Labor Relations Act and
the National Labor Relations Board? There has been more
discussion of this Act than any of the others. It has been
more controversial than any of the others. That is un-
doubtedly due to the fact that it deals with controversies
that have existed for over half a century and continue to
this very day. The controversies started with the beginning
of the trade movement in the United States, and have con-
tinued since, and from what we hear daily over the radio,
are still going on. Why a trade movement in America? It
started at about the time of the begnning of corporate and
industrial expansion which I referred to a moment ago.
There are three essentials to a successful and prosperous in-
dustry - Capital, Labor, and Consumer. Much was done
for the promotion and security of capital. Although aids
were given to capital, labor was left to fight its own battle.
What about labor during our spree of expansion and produc-
tion? What about the consumer made up largely of the
4 41 C. J. § 79-%, p. 114.
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laboring men and the farmers of America? Was it not the
neglect of labor and the farmer that was responsible for the
business and industrial depression in 1929? Was it not an
unequal struggle between capital and labor that made it
necessary for labor to organize? Capital is organized. Why
not labor? Capital acts collectively and through representa-
tives. Why not collective bargaining for labor? It was only
through the combined efforts of organized labor that labor
was able to obtain some share of the fruits of expanding
business and industry. Here are a few examples of contest
between labor and capital. The struggle started over the
recognition of organized labor. Capital refused to recognize
labor unions and a laboring man seeking employment had to
sign a contract that he would not join a labor union if he
wanted the job, or wanted to keep his job. These contracts
were referred to 'by labor as "yellow-dog contracts." Then
came the struggle over injunctions in Labor-Capital con-
troversies, the struggle for minimum wage laws, for shorter
hours of labor, for child labor laws, for workmen's compen-
sation laws, for safety laws, for social security laws, and
for a recognition of the principle of collective bargaining.
During the World War, a war labor board under the co-
chairmanship of ex-president Taft and Frank P. Walsh was
organized for a settlement of controversies between labor
and capital. Many of the rules prescribed by this board
were embodied in the Railway Labor Act which was passed
on May 20, 1926.
The main provisions of the Act, in brief, were as follows:
1. It provided for voluntary settlement of disputes be-
tween carriers and employees through chosen repre-
sentatives of both parties.
2. It provided that such representatives be choosen
without interference, influence, or coercion by either
party and that representatives need not be persons in
employ of the carrier.
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3. It provided for recognition of the right to organize
and bargain collectively.
4. It voided agreements to join or not to join a labor
union- outlawed the so-called "yellow-dog con-
trads."
5. It provided for a national labor adjustment board and
for procedure before it if voluntary settlement could
not be made.
By the application of the provisions of the Railway Labor
Act and the work of the National Railroad Adjustment
Board, we have had no railroad strikes since that Act was
passed.
Because of the frequency of labor disputes and strikes in
other industries, Congress embodied some provisions of the
Railway Labor Act in the National Industrial Recovery Act
passed on June 16, 1933. Section 707 of that Act secured
for labor in industry - (1) recognition of the right to or-
ganize and 'bargain collectively; (2) outlawed the "yellow-
dog" contract; (3) provided for compliance with maximum
hours of labor and minimum wages and other conditions of
employment approved or prescribed by the President. On
May 27, 1935 the N. I. R. A. was declared unconstitutional.5
Within two months following the decision, Congress on
July 5, 1935 passed the National Labor Relations Act and
created the National Labor Relations Board. In passing
this Act, Congress had the same purpose in view as in pass-
ing the Railway Labor Act and it was hoped that it would
meet with similar success.
Railroads cooperated in making the Railway Labor Act
work, but a different story must be told as to the coopera-
tion of industry with the National Labor Relations Act.
This Act has been subject to the fiercest attacks by indus-
trialists, corporation lawyers, columnists, newspapers and
5 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55
Sup. Ct. Rep. 837, 97 A. L. R. 947, 79 L. Ed. 1570 (1935).
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politicians, and the attacks continue, unabated. It is beyond
understanding why this law is subject to such vicious at-
tacks, and the Railway. Labor Act which contains similar
provisions as to labor relations, is lauded to the skies. Here
is a law whose purpose is the promotion of peace in in-
dustry, for the securing of a long-sought justice and square
deal for the great masses of laboring men of America;
- for social justice, if you please. Strikes are burdensome
to capital and cause untold suffering to laboring men and
their families; and yet, our industrialists do not show that
cooperative spirit with a law whose purposes are to prevent
strikes. Then, too, I think it is a tragedy that during the
beginning of procedure under this Act, labor, although united
in support of it, is rent in twain. This has not only brought
controversies between labor and capital, but controversies
between the two factions in organized labor.
I repeat, it is beyond understanding why this Act should
be subject to such violent attacks and the honorable men
who have worked so hard and so ably to administer it, have
been unjustly slandered and maligned. I attribute the op-
position to this Act to selfishness which has grown up among
the people in America and especially the investors and man-
agers of our corporations. The corporation - the soul-less
entity - which has, under our laws, grown so enormous
and so powerful that instead of being a servant of the people
it has become a monster for their destruction. Because of
its size, its complexity and the multifariousness of its con-
duct, it has destroyed and is destroying all human relations
in business and industry. Being organized for profit, it has
promoted greed, made men lose all sense of human values,
and led them to worship at the shrine of mammon. In the
mad rush for profits and wealth, human rights and human
welfare are forgotten. These soul-less creatures that have
destroyed man's humanity to man; that have encouraged
the concentration of wealth in the hands of the few; that
have promoted over-expansion in industry which brought
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about the depression in 1929, must mend their ways.
Through their managers they must show a better spirit of
cooperation with American labor, if our industrial system
and our American way of life is to survive in this world
of isms destructive of "rights of life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness."
That there has not been a wholesome cooperation on the
part of industry is illustrated by the recent refusal by a
company of the use of one of its plants for an election for
the choice of a labor-bargaining agency.
Another corporation, admitting that the facts in a written
agreement were as agreed to by labor and management, re-
fused -to sign such agreement. The controversy over this
petty and unreasonable refusal on the part of management
was carried to the Supreme Court of the United States, and
in a decision handed down on January 6, 1941, the Supreme
Court unanimously held that such a refusal was an unfair
labor practice.6
I do not mean to convey by this, that organized labor is
without fault. Its demands have many times been unreason-
able. The division within its ranks have brought unneces-
sary disputes between labor and industry. Then, too, in its
ranks are found men who believe in foreign isms that are
contrary to our way of life, - isms that would destroy basic
American rights of liberty and property. Such men, by
their voice and conduct, stir up unnecessary controversies
between labor and capital and, it seems, would rejoice in
the fall of our industrial system. However, I must add this,
that labor showed a real cooperative spirit when it accepted
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States out-
lawing sit-down strikes. We have had no such strikes since.7
6 H. J. Heinz Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 61 Sup. Ct. Rep.
320 (1941).
7 National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation, 306
U. S. 240, 59 Sup. Ct. Rep. 490, 83 L. Ed. 627 (1938).
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Today, over the radio and in the press, we hear of strikes
and threats of strikes. I sometimes wonder if these frequent
reports are not propaganda to discredit the work of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board. Many of these controversies
are over trivial matters. In recent weeks most of these have
been adjusted through the fine service of representatives of
the National Labor Relations Board. Probabl ¢ one reason
that so many strikes are being prevented and are being
speedily settled is because of the present threats to our
Democracy from without. Men in both labor and industry,
though selfish at times they may be, are united patriotic
Americans in the preservation of the American way. What
is this American way we desire to preserve? Will we pre-
serve it if we are only "go-getters and not go-givers?" In
our American life, unless we give as well as take, we will
not be able to save the American way. In industrial dis-
putes, unless those who represent Capital and those who
represent Labor meet in a spirit of fair play, we will not
have peace in industry. Unless they meet, not as organiza-
tions but as Americans, yielding and receiving what is fair
and just to both sides in a spirit of brotherhood, we will not
save Americanism and "our Democracy. Let me quote a
definition of true Americanism by Dr. Dorothy Reed of
Oregon:
"Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; life instead of mere exist-
ence, a life which precludes insecurity and unsanitary and unwhole-
some conditions of living; liberty instead of license, a liberty which
precludes crime and lawlessness and graft and- anarchy; and the pur-
suit of happiness instead of mere gratification of the senses, a happiness
which leads to a higher plane of social and political intelligence, a shift
of emphasis from things to thoughts, from material success to a better
understanding of man's relation to man and man's relation to his God."
What about the constitutional validity of these Acts creat-
ing boards and commissions? We all agree that strictly
governmental affairs and public utilities and interstate rail-
roads are unquestionably subject to government regulation
which may be by boards and commissions. The constitu-
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tional validity of such boards is seldom raised and is quite
uniformly conceded. But the boards and commissions to
which strenuous constitutional objections are being raised,
are those that regulate private affairs and private trade and
business. As to these, Col. Henry Watterson, the great
editor and publisher of the Louisville Courier Journal, once
remarked, "It has come to a pretty pass when a man can't
wallop his own jackass."
Of the Acts creating boards and commissions that I have
discussed thus far, the Workmen's Compensation Act, the
Federal Trade Commission Act, and the National Labor Re-
lations Act did create boards and commissions that regulate
private affairs.
The Workmen's Compensation Acts were not accepted
without contest. As soon as these Acts were passed, actions
were started to test their constitutionality. No time was
wasted. Unlimited resources were devoted to law research
and employment of counsel. Able arguments of learned
counsel were presented on both sides. Every possible ques-
tion as to validity was raised, argued and considered. Let
me recite a list of ten claims as violations of the Constitution
that were raised against the Compensation Acts: (1) Denial
of liberty and property without due process of law; (2)
Denial of equal protection of law; (3) Denial of a jury
trial; (4) Delegation of legislative power to a commission;
(5) Delegation of judicial power to a commission; (6) Im-
pairment of the obligation of contract; (7) Denial of free-
dom of contract; (8) Abrogation of employer's defenses;
(9) Providing for liability without fault; (10) Contrary to
public policy. Practically the same grounds of unconstitu-
tionality that were made against the Compensation Acts
then, have been raised against similar Federal Acts, against
the National Labor Relations Act, and other statutes regu-
lating private affairs with two added: (1) That the powers
exercised were not granted to Congress in the Federal Con-
stitution; and (2) that the enactment violated the Bill of
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Rights of the Federal Constitution. Contentions against
federal legislation passed during the first World War, and
following it, have become a daily dozen. Day after day,
in the halls of Congress, in the press, before dinner clubs
and social clubs, during a political campaign, and after a
political campaign, there is this continual rythmatic exercise
of condemnation of boards and commissions on constitutional
grounds.
However, in only two States were Compensation Acts de-
clared unconstitutional. One of the States amended its con-
stitution and re-passed the Act, and the other shortly passed
one which stood the constitutional test.
Time will not permit a discussion of all the contentions
made against the validity of the Compensation Acts and the
National Labor Relations Act. Some of these contentions
were without much merit and were easily disposed of. I
will briefly discuss those contentions that deal with, - (1)
violation of the bill of rights of the State and federal consti-
tutions; and (2) those that deal with the doctrine of separa-
tion and delegation of powers; and (3) those that deal with
the granted and implied powers of Congress in passing
federal regulatory Acts such as the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.
At the outset I stated that every government exercises
three inherent governmental powers, namely, Taxation,
Police Power, and the Power of Eminent Domain. In con-
sidering the validity of a State regulatory law such as the
Compensation Act, the police power of the State must be
considered. This is the power of a government to provide
for the health, safety, morals and welfare of the people.
The reasonable exercise of this power by the State is prac-
tically unlimited. With our individual rights, in order
that we may peaceably live and enjoy them, there is a cor-
responding duty to subject these rights for the common
good of others as well as ourselves. All of our rights are
subject to the reasonable exercise of the police power. All
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the criminal laws on our State statute books, all the police
ordinances, are enacted under this power. Let me give a
few examples of laws passed under this police power: our
quarantine and vaccination laws, traffic laws, lighting laws,
fire prevention laws, building regulations, zoning ordinances;
laws regulating hotels, dance halls, sale of drugs and in-
toxicating liquors; our child-labor laws, minimum wage
laws; our insurance and banking laws; our laws licensing
doctors, dentists, lawyers, accountants, and other professions.
These are but a few of many examples of laws to which our
rights must yield. Our rights in organized society are not
absolute. We can not do as we please with our lives and our
property. Liberty is not a license. If a person assaults an-
other, if he steals, he may be imprisoned and thus be de-
prived of his liberty. Take the right to own and enjoy
property. That too is a relative right. A person or a cor-
poration cannot use his or its property to invade the rights
of others, to violate the health, safety, morals or general
welfare of the people. A man can't build a gas station where
he pleases. He can't rent his house for immoral purposes.
He can't store gasoline in his basement. He can't throw
garbage and rubbish around as he pleases. Many other
examples of this kind could be given. Our Compensation
Acts were enacted under the police power. The States that
enacted the State Labor Relations Acts enacted them under
the police power.
Police power such as the States exercise has not been ex-
pressly granted to the Congress in the Constitution, but im-
pliedly Congress has the power to provide for the health,
safety, morals and general welfare in connection with the
powers granted. For example, under the express power to
regulate commerce, Congress has enacted statutes to pro-
mote health, safety, morals and matters of general welfare
to protect and promote interstate and foreign commerce.
Notable examples of this are the Mann Act, Railway Labor
Act, and the National Labor Relations Act.
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On April 12, 1937, by a 5-to-4 decision the Supreme Court
of the United States held the National Labor Relations Act
constitutional. The majority opinion was by Chief Justice
Hughes and the dissenting opinion by Justice McReynolds.
In the dissenting opinion, Justices VanDevanter, Sutherland
and Butler concurred.' Previous to this, six United States
District Courts and four Circuit Courts of Appeal had de-
clared this Act unconstitutional on the authority of the
Schecter decision which declared the N.I.R.A. unconstitu-
tional.
The decision of the Supreme Court in the Jones & Laugh-
lin case came as a distinct surprise to the corporation lawyers.
On the power of Congress to pass this Act under the grant
of power given in the Commerce Clause, Chief Justice
Hughes thus spoke for the court:
"The congressional authority to protect interstate commerce from
burdens and obstructions is not limited to transactions which can be
deemed to be an essential part of a 'flow' of interstate or foreign com-
merce. Burdens and obstructions may be due to injurious action spring-
ing from other sources. The fundamental principle is that the power to
regulate commerce is the power to enact 'all appropriate legislation' for
'its protection and advancement'; to adopt measures 'to promote its
growth and insure its safety'; 'to foster, protect, control "and restrain.'
That power is plenary and may be exerted to protect interstate com-
merce 'no matter what the source of the dangers which threaten it.'
Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately con-
sidered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that
commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied
the power to exercise that control."
As both State and Federal governments are, under their
constitutions, committed to the doctrine of separation of
powers, I will briefly discuss the charges of violation of this
doctrine by both State and Federal regulatory laws creat-
ing boards and commissions. Did the legislative branches
of our government delegate their power to boards and com-
8 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301
U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. Rep. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893 (1936).
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missions in the passage of Compensation Acts and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act?
The question of delegation of legislative power was con-
sidered very early in our history. In the case of Wayman v.
Southard,9 decided in 1825, Chief Justice Marshall said on
this question:
"Congress may certainly delegate to others powers which the legis-
lature may rightfully exercise itself ...
"The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important
subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from
those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and
power given to those who are to act under such general provisions to
fill up the details."
In the case of United States v. Grimaud,'0 decided in 1911,
the United States Supreme Court expressed itself thus on
this question: "Congress may declare its will and after af-
fixing a primary standard, devolve upon administrative of-
ficers the 'power to fill up the details' by prescribing adminis-
trative rules and regulations."
The reason that the N.I.R.A. was declared unconstitu-
tional in the Schecter case is because Congress did not pro-
vide sufficient standards. In that Act, the power to provide
standards was delegated to the President and his advisory
committee. The codes fixing the standards were framed by
advisory committees and promulgated by the President.
Here was a clear delegation of Legislative Power.
This is not the case in Workmen's Compensation Acts nor
the National Labor Relations Act.
In the Compensation Acts the legislatures clearly fixed
standards by providing a complete schedule of injuries and
prescribing the amount of compensation for each; and also
prescribing the amount of death benefits and to whom pay-
able.
9 10 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 253 (1825).
10 220 U. S. 506, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 480, 55 L. Ed. 563 (1910).
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In the National Labor Relations Act, Congress clearly
fixed standards by providing what constitute unfair labor
practices.
In the administration of the Compensation Act, the com-
pensation board does not fix damages for injuries nor does it
award damages for negligent death. The legislature has
done that. The board merely investigates and finds the
facts and by the application of the compensation law to
the facts found, the amount of compensation or death bene-
fit is determined and awarded.
The same is true in the administration of the National
Labor Relations Act. Congress has provided what consti-
tutes unfair labor practices. The National Labor Board
merely investigates and finds the facts and by the applica-
tion of the law to the facts found, the Board enters an order
to desist or to comply, as the case may be.
In neither of these cases are the awards or orders final.
To make them final an appeal must be made to the courts
for their enforcement.
It is also argued that these acts violate the doctrine of
separation of powers by exercising judicial power. Right in
this connection let me repeat that the boards and commis-
sions are merely fact-finding bodies and not courts. They
do not have judicial power. They have no power to punish
for contempt nor to issue executions to enforce their orders.
The issuing of a notice of a hearing, issuing of subpoenas
for witnesses, the examination of witnesses, the finding of
facts and conclusions are not the exercise of judicial power.
If that be so, then notaries public, commissioners, referees,
prothonotaries are exercising judicial powers. All lawyers
and judges know that these are ministerial officers and ex-
ercise only administrative power. On this matter let me
quote briefly from an opinion in the case of Underwood v.
McDuffee. n The court said:
11 15 Mich. 361, 93 Am. Dec. 194 (1867).
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"No action which is merely preparatory to an order or judgment to
be rendered by some different body can be properly termed judicial.
A master in chancery often has occasion to consider questions of law
and of fact, but no one ever supposed him to possess judicial power.
A jury in a court of record determines all the facts in a case, but the
judicial power is in the court which enforces the verdict by judgment."
Now as to the denial of due process under the 5th and
14th Amendments and the State bills of rights. In the 14th
Amendment it is provided that no State "shall deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.". . . The 5th Amendment prohibits Federal government
from denying due process and State bills or rights also se-
cure it. What is due process of law? What processes are
essential to give it? Due process of law contemplates (1)
Notice, (2) Opportunity to be heard, and (3) a fair hear-
ing. However, what is due process in one kind of a pro-
ceeding may not be due process in another. For example,
there are summary proceedings in which notice is not es-
sential. Nor does due process require jury's finding as a
part of the hearing in all cases. It has been uniformly held
that in an administrative proceeding where notice of a hear-
ing has been given and sufficient time has been given to ap-
pear at the time and place of hearing, and a fair hearing
has been held (not necessarily according to formalities in
court), and then to that is added a review process in the
court, due process has been given.
Gentlemen, I have probably given too many details about
two or three boards or commissions. The story of the ad-
vent of these is the story of the advent of all. I related how
progress of the race and changes in the way of doing things
as time goes on, demand different treatment, different and
more expeditious procedure. Times have changed and times
will continue to change. With the growth of our country,
and the progress in science, invention and education, with
the expansion of industry and changes in commerce, more
boards and commissions may become necessary to carry on
the processes of democratic government. Reasonably pro-
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viding for these changes does not destroy our fundamental
rights nor deny to us the inherent and inalienable "rights
of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." It does not
destroy our constitutional government. Our Constitution
was not written for a decade or a century. Properly and
reasonably construed it adapts itself to our progress.
In this connection, I cannot refrain from quoting from an
opinion by Chief Justice Winslow in the case of Borgnis v.
Falk Company (133 N. W. 209) which sustained the con-
stitutionality of the Wisconsin Compensation Act. In that
opinion Chief Justice Winslow so clearly answered all the
claims raised against validity of the Act and on the question
of construction of constitutions he used these words:
"But the difficulty is that, while the Constitution is fixed or very
hard to change, the conditions and problems surrounding the people,
as well as their ideals, are constantly changing. The political or phil-
osophical aphorism of one generation is doubted by the next, and en-
tirely discarded by the third. The race moves forward constantly, and
no Canute can stay its progress. By what standards is this general lan-
guage or general policy to be interpreted and applied to present day
people and conditions? When an 18th century Constitution forms the
charter of liberty of a 20th century government, must its general pro-
visions be construed and interpreted by an 18th century mind in the
light of 18th century conditions and ideals? Clearly not. This were to
command the race to halt in its progress, to stretch the State upon a
veritable bed of Procrustes. The charged social, economic, and govern-
mental conditions and ideals of the time, as well as the problems which
the changes have produced, must also logically enter into the considera-
tion, and become influential factors in the settlement of problems of
construction and interpretation."
Speaking about reforms in procedure, Chief Justice
Hughes admonished the legal profession in these words:
"You can not maintain democratic institutions by mere forms of
words, or by occasional patriotic vows. You maintain them by making
the institutions of our Republic work as they are intended to work.
Here lies your responsibility with respect to this sphere of democratic
action in translating the law of the land into the decision of particular
controversies so that every citizen may be assured of equal justice ac-
cording to law."
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Why do we have tax commissions? Why do we have to
fill out such detailed blanks as to assessments and as to our
incomes? To prepare these blanks, to examine them and
check them requires bureaus and many employees. Because
among us there are a few tax evaders and tax dodgers, all of
us - honest or dishonest must give this detailed information
in order that there might be equality in taxation.
Why provide for boards of health, safety and morals?
Because in organized society there are those who will dis-
obey laws pertaining to health, safety and morals; and all
of us, law-abiding as well as law-breaking, must submit to
regulations and pay taxes to support health boards and com-
missions. You say, Why not prosecute those who violate
the law? In the complexity of our life, our business, manu-
facturing and commerce, we have found that violators of
the laws find it easy to evade them, and under technicalities
of criminal process they get away with it.
Whyhave an Interstate Commerce Commission and Pub-
lic Utilities Commission? Because some railroads and util-
ities charged exorbitant rates, discriminated in rates, violated
safety laws, and because our processes in courts were inade-
quate to make them obey the laws, all law-abiding railroads
and utilities as well as the criminal ones must submit to
regulations by commissions.
Why have a Federal Trade Commission, a Securities Ex-
change Commission? To destroy unfair business practices
by a few business men and to prevent stock gamblers from
mulcting millions of dollars from the American investors by
selling them worthless stocks and securities. We have
Workmen's Compensation Commissions because our pro-
cedure in court in personal-injury cases became inadequate
to provide for social and economic justice to the injured
laborers of America. We have Labor Relations Acts and
boards to free and emancipate labor from unjust practices
by organized capital and to promote a just peace in Ameri-
can industry.
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One more thought: on the whole, commissioners and of-
ficers of State and Federal bureaus are sincere and honest
men and women, and able public officials. Many of them
are lawyers, doctors, scientists and economists. The nature
of their work brings them into close contact with the daily
life of our people. The law imposes upon them duties that
are arduous and frequently disagreeable. That they make
mistakes is but human. In the Annual Report of the At-
torney General of the United States for the fiscal year end-
ing June 30, 1940, on page 47 it is stated that during the
ten-year period prior to 1938
"... orders of administrative agencies had fared better in the Su-
preme Court than had the decisions of the lower Federal courts review-
ing such orders, or the decisions of such courts coming before the Su-
preme Court in cases not involving administrative orders. During that
period the Supreme Court affirmed 64 per cent of the administrative
orders which it considered. The percentage at the last term was con-
siderably in excess of that percentage, being a fraction over 76. In con-
trast the percentage of affirmances of the decisions of the lower Federal
courts reviewing administrative orders was only 41, and the percentage
of affirmances of the decisions of those courts in cases other than those
reviewing administrative orders was only 39."
Think of the thousands and tens of thousands of cases that
are being handled by administrative boards and commissions
throughout the United States every year. Whenever here
and there we find an incompetent examiner or commissioner
or hear of an erroneous decision, it is publicized everywhere
and general condemnation of the administrative process re-
sults.
Statistics show that 90% of matters within the jurisdic-
tion of administrative boards are adjusted without contest.
In 10% of the cases applications are filed and half of these
are adjusted and do not come to a hearing. Only 5% are
contested and a very small percentage of these are reviewed
before courts. Considering the nature of their work, these
officials have made and are making a record of incomparable
public service.
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Instead of continually doubting their sincerity, misrepre-
senting their conduct and condemning their work, let us give
them that encouragement that they deserve. George Mat-
thews Adams says:
"Encouragement is oxygen to the soul. Good work can never be ex-
pected from a worker without encouragement. No one ever climbed
spiritual heights without it. No one ever lived without it."
In the words of Justice Hughes, "you can not maintain
democratic institutions by mere forms of words or by oc-
casional patriotic vows." Gentlemen, we can not inculcate
love and respect for our Government among our children and
the rest of the world, if by indiscriminate criticism we con-
demn the men who administer it.
Democracies have been chided and scoffed at by the totali-
tarian dictators of Europe, and the small democracies of
Europe have been ruthlessly destroyed under the philoso-
phies of hate, and that might makes right. It is for America,
the greatest Democracy in the world, to demonstrate to the
people of the world that the people in Democracy can unite
and stand united in the support of their Government, and
that Democracy can and does work.
Dean Thomas F. Konop.
College of Law, University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana.
